I. Introduction
Internet auction sites like eBay are increasingly being used to sell mass-produced consumer durables: the largest eBay categories in dollar terms are: cars, consumer electronics, computers, clothing/accessories, and books/movies/music (2004 company report) . Since the ending times of the individual auctions are not synchronized, each of these markets evolves as a sequence, allowing bidders to focus on the auction that will end first, while accounting for the fact that there will be other auctions later. The eBay webpage design reinforces the sequential conceptualization by listing auctions in a sequence, with the default ordering by ending time (see Appendix 1 for a snapshot of the eBay auction-listing webpage), and by allowing bidders to place future auctions on their private watch-lists. Because online auctions are usually listed for several days before concluding, detailed information about what and when will be sold in the near future is available to bidders. Two important questions thus arise, namely how should rational bidders use such information, and how do eBay bidders seem to use the information available to them. To answer these questions, this paper develops a new model of equilibrium bidding in a very long sequence of auctions, and provides empirical evidence of the model's relevance to actual behavior of eBay bidders.
The model assumes that each product-category is horizontally differentiated into several types of goods, with each bidder having a unit demand for only one type of the good. For example, a consumer may be shopping for one DVD of her favorite movie, or for one unit of a specific brand and model of an MP3-player. The model departs from previous models of sequential auctions by assuming that bidders know not only the type of the current product they are bidding on, but also what type will be sold next and when. In other words, the bidders are not only forward-looking in that they anticipate a future auction, but also forward-seeing in that they know detailed information about several future auctions.
When bidding in any particular auction within a sequence, each bidder faces a tradeoff between winning now and winning later. The tradeoff arises from the fact that the individual desired units are perfect substitutes: the winner of each auction exits the marketplace and hence foregoes the expected surplus from participating in future auctions that also sell her desired good, possibly for a lower price. Therefore, the bidder faces a positive opportunity cost of winning now, and the opportunity cost is exactly the expected surplus from participating in future auctions conditional on losing the current auction. For example, a bidder who values a DVD of "Gladiator" $20 and wins it for $12 receives a surplus of $8, but incurs an additional opportunity cost from foregoing future auctions of Gladiator, and this opportunity cost is exactly the future surplus this bidder would expect if she lost the current auction instead, and bid on another Gladiator DVD in the future. Because they face a positive opportunity cost of winning, rational bidders should reduce their bids relative to the myopic bidding strategy that would be optimal in the absence of future auctions selling the desired type of good. Bidders do not need to be forward-seeing in order to be forward-looking and acknowledge the chance that future auctions may sell the desired type of good. Both Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1994) and Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003) model forward-looking bidding in a sequence of heterogeneous substitutes, and conclude that bidders reduce their bids by the opportunity cost arising from the fact that the objects sold are substitutes.
When forward-looking bidders also see forward, the expected future surplus is a function of the available information about what and when will be sold in the near future -both the timing of the upcoming auctions as well as the types of products sold in those auctions. The equilibrium analysis of the game with forward-seeing bidders is complicated by several dependencies that prevent a closed-form solution. In particular, the expected surplus function depends on the bidding strategy while the bidding strategy in turn depends on the expected surplus function. While the equilibrium bidding strategy is thus intractable in closed form, this paper shows that there exists a well-behaved symmetric pure-strategy Markov Perfect equilibrium bidding function whose comparative statics can be characterized without relying on specific assumptions about the distribution of personal valuations in the bidder population.
The properties of the equilibrium bidding strategy depend on how much detail of the available information about near-future auctions do the bidders actually use, i.e. how sophisticated are the bidders in taking the information into account. Three nested levels of such information-usage sophistication are considered: First, when bidders ignore the information completely, the model reduces to a special case of the model of Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1994) , in which bids do not depend on short-term variation in the near-future frequency of auctions or on variation in the near-future incidence of specific product-types. Second, auctions ending within the next hour are highlighted in red on eBay, so frequency of near-future auctions is easier to discern than the specific attributes of the objects sold. Therefore, it is important to consider an intermediate level of sophistication, in which bidders see only the general frequency of auctions in the near-future, but not the types of the individual future objects. Such bidders should reduce their bids more whenever there are more auctions ending soon, because that decreases the expected waiting time until another unit of their desired types comes up for sale, and hence increases the expected future surplus.
Finally, each bidder can actually examine the near-future auctions closely and base her bidding strategy not only on timing, but also on the types of objects actually coming up for sale.
When rational bidders consider the specific objects coming up for sale in the future, the opportunity cost of winning today becomes a function of personal preferences for the future items -the more desirable products coming up and the sooner they are coming up, the higher the future expected surplus.
How much detail of the available information about near-future auctions do actual eBay bidders use is an empirical question, and this paper proposes an empirical strategy to answer this question using standard eBay data. The empirical strategy relies on measuring the relationship between bids and both object-types and ending-times of near-future auctions, a relationship for which the three levels of information-use sophistication generate the above-described nested restrictions of the "most sophisticated" bidding function. Consumer preferences in the data are identified using the assumption that each consumer desires only a subset of product-types and considers all desired units to be identical in terms of utility. Then, the theory predicts that observing a positive bid on a given type reveals the bidder's preference for that type, and it is thus possible to classify the types of products immediately following the current auction as either desired or not desired by that particular bidder. Assuming that the variation in short-term frequency of different types among the already-listed auctions is exogenous to current bids, it is possible to determine the best-fitting model by examining the empirical correlations between bids and both object-types and ending-times of near-future auctions. To test the model's predictions, two different datasets are used, one from the MP3-player category with each player brand-model combination considered to be a different type, and one from the DVD movie category with different product-types assigned to different movie-titles. The empirical test on both product categories rejects the two nested simpler models in favor of the "most sophisticated" model, in which bidders take their personal preferences for specific future products into account. Therefore, the model of forward-looking behavior proposed here is relevant to understanding the demand-side of auction-driven marketplaces like eBay.
The paper is structured as follows: Section II provides a brief review of the relevant literature. Section III then presents the model that constitutes the main theoretical contribution of this paper, and Section IV discusses the robustness of the model predictions to perturbations in the assumptions. Section V presents the results of an empirical test that demonstrates the relevance of the proposed model to actual bidding behavior observed on eBay. Section VI then concludes by discussing the implications of the present findings for researchers studying the growing auction-driven online marketplaces, as well as for both buyers and sellers in those marketplaces.
II. Literature review
This work draws on literatures studying online auctions specifically and multi-object auctions in general. Online auctions have only existed for about eight years, so academic research focusing on them is relatively scarce. The issue of multi-auction online bidding has not been addressed except for work by Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) , who study bidder entry in common-value auctions, and Dholakia and Soltysinski (2001) , who find a "herding bias" -consumers flocking to popular auctions despite the existence of other auctions for substitute items. The "herding bias" is especially relevant to this work because it provides another layer of behavioral complexity on top of the rational behavior described here.
The theoretical model proposed here is not confined to online auctions, and contributes to the general auction theory literature. The vast auction theory literature focuses predominantly on single isolated auctions, and investigations of the issues arising from multiple related auctions are comparatively rare as pointed out by Klemperer (1999) in a recent review of the literature.
Previous work on sequences of auctions has mostly focused on price-trends in finite sequences of auctions, motivated by empirical discovery of the "price-decline anomaly" by Ashenfelter (1989) and others. This paper does not study price-trends in finite sequences, but instead builds an infinitehorizon model and investigates equilibrium bidding as a function of bidder information about near-future auctions. The model extends the finite-horizon identical-goods model of Milgrom and Weber (1999) to an infinite horizon and horizontally differentiated goods. A very simple differentiation into a finite number of mutually exclusive types is assumed, so the extension amounts to assuming several randomly-interlaced sequences of identical-goods sequences. The proposed model is thus the simplest model that involves unit-demand bidders and non-trivial information about the near-future auctions. The extension to infinite-horizon is designed to match eBay reality, and it is non-trivial because it requires bidder-pool turnover and replenishment whereas the original finite-horizon model of Milgrom and Weber depends heavily on the depletion of the bidder pool together with the certainty that each losing bidder advances to the next auction. Because the model considers a sequence of auctions for non-identical objects with knowledge of future objects, it also extends the model of Gale and Hausch (1994) , who examine the case of continuously heterogeneous objects by focusing on the special case of two bidders and two auctions. The extension beyond two auctions is accomplished here thanks to the simplifying assumption on the product-heterogeneity being captured by a finite number of types.
The most important simpler benchmark is provided by the model of similar but unseen future objects (Engelbrecht-Wiggans 1994), a special case of which is nested in the proposed model: when only some fixed common distribution of future products is known, bidders can still engage in forward-looking strategies, but they are unable to use the forward-seeing strategies captured by the model proposed here.
On the empirical front, the most related work is a recent paper by Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003) . They investigate sequential auctions for highway construction procurement contracts in California, and they find evidence of forward-looking behavior using a structural model. Forward-seeing behavior is not part of their model because bidders are assumed to not take public information about upcoming auctions into account. Another important difference is that this paper conducts an empirical test non-parametrically without functional-form assumptions that would be necessary for a structural econometric model.
Outside of the game-theoretic equilibrium paradigm, several papers have tackled the problem of optimal bidding in sequential auctions by applying optimal control methodology after noting that a game-theoretic treatment would be much more difficult (see Oren and Rothkopf 1975 for a seminal contribution and Arora et. al., 2002 for a recent example and a good review of this stream). This line of research assumes a single strategic bidder facing non-strategic competition, limiting the applicability of the conclusions and the kind of competitive phenomena that can be investigated.
III. Theory of forward-looking bidding with public information about near-future auctions Assumptions
To obtain a tractable model of strategic bidding in multiple auctions, it is necessary to assume that the individual auctions are relatively simple. The key simplifying assumption of this paper is that valuations for the objects are private and independent across bidders (IPV). This assumption would be inappropriate for some economically small eBay product-categories like antiques and collectibles, in which valuations are most likely "affiliated" across bidders (Milgrom & Weber 1982) . Nevertheless, the economically largest eBay categories involve mass-produced goods like consumer electronics, which are usually purchased for private use, and with the private valuations driven by personal preferences. Therefore, the IPV assumption is reasonable as a model of consumer preferences in a large class of online auctions, in particular the auctions for MP3 players and DVDs considered in the empirical section of this paper. Validity of this abstraction is supported by the fact that bidding on eBay both should and does tend to happen at the very end of each auction, not giving the competitive bidders time to react to each other's bids (Roth & Ockenfels 2002) . Moreover, the simplification is not overly restrictive in the context of independent valuations since bidders do not try to learn about their own preferences from other people's bids. To approximate the price-determination in the eBay's ascending English auction, the models examine second-price auctions, in which the highest bidder wins the object, but only pays the second highest bid as the price. One more simplifying assumption is necessary for a tractable model, namely that bidders do not consider past prices. Suppose they did. Then, since past prices are upper bounds on the past bids of competing bidders who did not win the past auction and hence may have survived until today, the outcomes of past auctions could be informative about the level of current and future competition. In the current formulation of the model, current competition does not enter equilibrium bidding, but future competition does. To make matters even more complicated, the past price-determining bidder would have slightly different information about the remaining competition than the bidders whose past bids were less than the past price. This asymmetry would escalate over time as pointed out by Milgrom and Weber (1999) . Therefore, considering a model of a very long sequence of auctions with memory of past outcomes would be highly problematic and most likely not tractable. Assuming the effects of past prices away does not have a big impact on the model because the effects are likely to be second-order, especially in an eBay-like environment characterized by a fluctuating and unobservable bidder pool.
Basic Model: 1-period look-ahead
There is an infinite sequence of instantaneous second-price sealed-bid auctions occurring at distinct and countable points of continuous time. The waiting time ω between auctions varies stochastically and independently, according to a known distribution. Bidders discount future utility exponentially by factor δ per unit of time, so outcome of a future auction ω units of time away is discounted by a factor δ ω .
Each auction sells one object. The objects offered for sale are horizontally differentiated into K+1 types, with probability of type k captured by rate ρ k . For example, the category of MP3
players is differentiated by brand-model combinations like "Rio 500", and the category of movies on DVD is differentiated by title of the movie. Each bidder desires one of the first K product-types in the sense that all non-desired types give the bidder no utility while the desired type gives the bidder a positive utility. For example, each bidder is interested in buying only one particular movie-title or only one particular model of MP3 player. No bidders desire the last K+1 st product type, which captures various suspect "free" offers as well as poorly described and misplaced goods that are bound to clutter any marketplace.
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Select an arbitrary auction and let the rest of the auctions be indexed relatively to the focal "current" auction, so the current auction has index 0, the immediately following auction index 1, the auction after that index 2, etc. To capture the type information, let
be the indicator function equal to one when auction j is of type k, and equal to zero otherwise. To capture the waiting-time information, let ω j be the waiting time between auction j-1 and j. The key innovation of this model is that bidders of type k know not only the desirability of the current
, but also the information product 0,k ϕ that arises from seeing forward, namely whether they desire the next product and how far in the future will the next sale occur. The fundamental difference between the two kinds of forward-seen information is that ϕ is inherently typespecific whereas ω 1 is the same for all types.
N k bidders participate in each auction of type k. Bidders also exit at random with an exogenously given probability ( 1-λ ) per timeperiod. Some bidder-replacement beyond the replacement of the winner is an essential feature of a realistic steady-state model, because when only the winner is replaced and bidders stay until they win an auction, the distribution of the steady-state survivors degenerates to a group of bidders with zero valuations. The bidders have no memory, so they cannot base their actions on outcomes of past auctions.
Equilibrium bidding strategy
Since the game has an infinite horizon and bidders have no memory, the only state-variables that distinguish one period from another are the desirability indicators ( ) , let c 0 be the amount the highest competitor would bid should ϕ = instead). Let G be the distribution of c 0 . Then, the bidder with valuation v i =v solves the following utilitymaximization problem to find the optimal steady-state bid ( )
In a symmetric equilibrium, the expected surplus function must account for the fact that other bidders are also reducing their current bids, so the current competition is weaker than if the competitors were not strategically forward-looking, and the future competition depends on the current competition. Furthermore, in an infinite-horizon setting employed here to capture a mature ongoing market, future bidders will again be reducing their bids as a function of the future's future and at least some of those future bidders will be current competitors who lost the present auction. Therefore, the expected surplus function depends on the bidding strategy while the bidding strategy in turn depends on the expected surplus function. These dependencies make a closed-form solution of the model unavailable, but a well-behaved equilibrium exists as shown in Proposition 1:
Proposition 1 (proof in Appendix 2): There is a symmetric pure-strategy Markov Perfect equilibrium characterized by a bidding function ( )
Where the expected steady-state function satisfies a set of Bellman equations (3):
The bidding strategy has several striking properties. First, it does not directly depend on G -a consequence of the general truth-revealing property of the second-price sealed-bid auction.
However, does depend on the current competition inasmuch as the current competition is informative about the future competition: When evaluating the option value of the future, the bidder assumes that she will lose the current period to a competitive bid that exactly matches her current bid. This "tie" is the only situation in which raising the current bid slightly changes the outcome of the game, and S given
is therefore the opportunity cost relevant at the margin. In other words, the bidder assumes she is pivotal to the outcome of the game, and the pivotal nature of a second-price auction thus comes through even in a sequential context. Finally, it is notable that bidders only submit positive bids on products of their desired type -a result that will lead to identification of personal preferences in the empirical test.
The bidding function is fully characterized by the expected surplus function S, which is in turn characterized by the steady-state distribution of the future competition c 1 conditional on the current competition c 0 and all the state variables involved in the relationship between them ϕ ϕ ϕ ω ω . In equilibrium, the surplus function must reflect the actual expected surplus given that everyone uses the optimal bidding strategy (2). Therefore, the equilibrium expected surplus function must satisfy the Bellman equation shown in Proposition 1. Such an S function exists because of the continuity of f, compactness of its support, and the fact (shown in the proof of Proposition 1) that the slope of S in any of its arguments cannot diverge to infinity.
However, equilibrium S cannot be expressed in closed form even for a simple distribution 
The first property shows that bids decrease when the future gets closer in the sense that ω 1 decreases. In the empirical section, an eBay-relevant generalization of this result will be tested, namely the prediction that bids decrease as the number of auctions in the next hour increases.
The second property contains several important results. The first inequality shows that all bidders with positive valuations submit positive bids on objects they desire and trade is thus guaranteed.
In the empirical section, this will be used to identify bidder preferences over types by interpreting a positive bid on a type as an indication of that type's desirability to the given bidder. The second inequality in 2) is the main result of this paper because it shows that all forward-seeing bidders of all types bid less when they see their desired object in the next period compared to when they see an object they don't desire. In the empirical section, a generalization
of this result will be tested. Finally, the third inequality provides a comparison of forward-seeing behavior to the myopic benchmark: forward-seeing bidders always bid less than they would if they were myopic because myopic bidders have a dominant strategy to bid their valuation in a second-price sealed-bid auction. The fundamental reason for the third inequality is the positive opportunity cost of winning, so it will hold for any forward-looking bidding strategy, even without forward-seeing.
The third property shows that as the long-term rate ρ of desired products increases, the bids decrease. The reason is that forward-seeing bidders are also forward-looking beyond the 
IV. Robustness of the model predictions
Several assumptions of the basic model can be relaxed without altering the key predictions of Proposition 2, namely that more desirable and more proximate near-future auctions lead to a reduction in current bids as does more desirable long-term future. These relaxations include a stochastically varying number of bidders, bidders idiosyncratically desiring more than one type of product, risk-averse bidders, the addition of speculators into the bidder pool, and bidders seeing more than one period ahead. This section discusses these relaxations in turn along with the boundaries beyond which the model breaks down.
Stochastic and unknown number of competing bidders
Within each product-type, number of bidders N k is assumed to be the same in each period. This assumption is reasonable if entry is, in fact, endogenous, and the bidders enter until their expected surplus is above some participation threshold. Moreover, specifying the model with a fixed N k simplifies the exposition without sacrificing generality because the model's qualitative conclusions will not be sensitive to variations in the assumption about the bidder pool as long as some bidders stay for multiple periods and there is a well-defined steady-state distribution of the number of bidders present. Since current competition generically does not enter the bidding strategy, the only difference a stochastic N k would make to the results is that the entire RHS of equation (3) would have to be integrated over the steady-state distribution of future N k , adding another argument to the expectation. Since future N k varies from one auction to the other on eBay and is ex-ante unknown, the empirical part of this paper will actually involve this extension of this model and the number of bidders will be taken into account.
Bidders desiring more than one type of product
Another variation of the model that can be accommodated is allowing each bidder to idiosyncratically desire more than one type, but still have only unit demand in the category and still consider all desired types identical in terms of utility. Thus, all private single-unit valuations v i would be drawn from some common distribution F, and ϕ would have to be specified for every bidder as , 1
when bidder i desires the type of product sold in auction j. Then, the private value to bidder i of product sold j auctions from now would be ϕ . This structure of preferences is thus relevant to the MP3 player category, where each bidder may only have use for one player but be indifferent among several models. In contrast, each movie-category bidder may have use for multiple DVDs as long as they all contain different movies. Allowing each bidder to have idiosyncratic preferences over multiple types would terminate the symmetry and independence across types that allowed the analysis of K=1 to be without loss of generality, and the model would have to be specified in terms of a set of type-specific equilibrium surplus functions S k . Then, it could again be shown that there is a set of type-specific equilibrium bidding functions ( ) [u(.) ] to compensate the bidder for the option-value of losing in terms of expected future utility in the case of a loss today (note that the λδ discounting factors become part of the utility expectation). Then, the first-order conditions that characterize optimal bidding are (suppressing states ϕ for clarity): ( ) ( )
. Therefore, the optimal bid
, where CE is the certainty equivalent. Since the certainty equivalent is always lower than the expected surplus, risk-averse bidders will all bid more than risk-neutral bidders, but all qualitative conclusions of Proposition 2 remain exactly as stated, so risk-aversion does not affect Proposition 2 qualitatively.
Presence of speculators
The model assumes that the bidders buy for private use and not for resale. This assumption can be justified by the fact that effective selling on eBay requires a much greater set of capabilities than buying on eBay: while buyers can treat eBay as any other online store, sellers need to have at least minimal web-publishing skills along with ability to ship goods and accept payments by various electronic methods. While a full treatment of all bidders considering resale would thus not be appropriate for the domain of online marketplaces, it is still possible that the sellers themselves act as speculators and submit bids in anticipation of reselling the purchased items later. While theoretically plausible, speculation for resale does not seem to be empirically prevalent in either of the two datasets considered in Section V: over 99 percent of the bidders are not observed selling anything in the same category within a month, and of the several thousand sellers observed, only about 2.5 percent submitted at least one bid per month within the entire category, all together affecting less than three percent of the auctions.
Even if private bidders bid while taking the presence of speculators into account, the main qualitative predictions of the theory remain unchanged for the domain of eBay because any resale on eBay is delayed by several days (median auction last a week and it takes time to physically receive a purchased object), and its possibility hence does not affect the already-listed objects offered in the near future -usually in matters of minutes. Instead, the anticipation of speculators bidding for resale would make ρ, the long-term rate of type-incidence, endogenous in the model.
Finally, even if speculators were able to resell instantaneously as may be the case in marketplaces other than eBay, their presence would not necessarily change the equilibrium behavior of the private bidders. In their recent paper, Garratt and Tröger (2004) show that in a simple setting of one auction and a future potential-resale period, second-price sealed-bid auctions are "weakly speculation-proof" in that the speculator bidding zero and never winning is H Ω is thus very easy to discern at a glance. is relevant because it is invariant to the way consumers actually use the eBay website, i.e. whether they search for the all listings in the category or for listings of their specific product-type only.
Given these definitions, the same arguments as in the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 can be used to show that there is a Markov Perfect equilibrium pure strategy
, with the following properties:
Corollary 1: When bidders see A periods ahead, the equilibrium bidding function has the following properties:
for all Φ Ω such that has one additional listing of any type in the next hour and is otherwise the same as ( ) 3) for all ( ) ( ) 
, and
The first two claims are direct analogues of 1) and 2) in Proposition 2 and they follow from the fact that even a chance of bidding on a desired product in the future always gives the bidder strictly more surplus than certainty of bidding on an undesired product. The last two claims need a little more explanation: Claim 3) states that bids decrease as the desired product becomes available earlier in calendar time, and is thus a time-based analogue of claim 1) that follows from discounting and the fact that attrition is linked to time. Claim 4) goes a step further and examines how the magnitude of the bid-decrement shown to be positive in 1) changes as the first occurrence of the desired product-type gets more distant in the sequence, keeping timing the same. The decrement becomes smaller as the future recedes into the distance -an immediate consequence of discounting and the chance of attrition.
To construct statements about average differences in bids for empirical testing, it is necessary to average over the parts of ( ) , Φ Ω kept constant in each claim of the Corollary 1. Let These four predictions can now be taken to the data to test whether and how much actual bidders see forward. By construction, if the bidders see only the H summary of the near future auctions, then prediction 1) will hold but the other predictions will not because they all rely on the bidders seeing types of the future products. Finally, when the bidders do not see forward, none of the predictions will hold.
V. Empirical Evidence: Analysis of eBay data
Section III proposed a model of forward-looking bidding with public information about both timing and objects of future auctions, and Section IV discussed the robustness of the model's qualitative predictions about the relationship between current bids and both object-types Φ and ending-times Ω of near-future auctions. This section uses the predictions highlighted in the end of Section IV to construct a statistical test that uses actual eBay bidding data, and attempts to reject the proposed model in favor of one of two simpler models: the model with forward-seeing of only the type-independent summary statistic H(Ω), and a model without any forward-seeing, i.e. without the information about the near future influencing current bids. Before describing the test and its results, it is necessary to describe some key features of the available data.
Data
EBay kindly provided two datasets, each corresponding to a different product-category: MP3 players and movies on DVD. Both categories involve differentiated mass-produced consumer goods usually bought for private use, so consumer preferences are likely to be well-approximated by the IPV framework underlying the model. As discussed in Section IV, most bidders do not engage in selling and hence are likely to have private valuations for the products. Moreover, consumers are likely to have unit demand for a specific model of an MP3 player or for a specific title of a movie, so the unit-demand assumption also fits the product domains.
Data from any online-auction site that only facilitates the communication between sellers is bound to come without definitive identification of each item sold. To match each listing to a product type (movie title or player model), researchers have to rely on the item description written by the sellers. Given the large volume of the data, automated procedures need to be used to "read" and classify the descriptions, and some classification error is inevitable, especially considering that no two objects sold on eBay are exactly alike. In both datasets used here, a word-matching algorithm classified about 80 percent of the listings as likely selling a known product-type, 2 but the resulting classification is still only approximate. To refine the classification, a few outlier auctions of each type were removed from the data because their final prices were too far out of line with the bulk of their type, suggesting that they probably actually sell something else than a single unit of the type as indicated by the word-matching algorithm. In the MP3 player category, 21 percent of all auction listings remained unclassified, either because their description was insufficient for identification ("new cool mp3 player for sale") or because they do not belong to the product category at all ("napster t-shirt" or "128mb sandisk memory card"). 3 Removing top and bottom three percent of all bids on each type is sufficient to eliminate all bids that are either multiples of the median price on the type, probably indicating an undetected bundle, or that are less than 10 percent of the type's median price, indicating a listing that is just an accessory or that is problematic for reasons unobserved by the analyst. 4 Please see www.ebay.com for a definition of proxy bids and a thorough description of the bidding rules.
beyond the scope of this paper, and because their early termination makes them not useful as resulting in an average number of unique bidders per auction of 3.7, median 3. The moviemarket thus involves much lower bidder-competition than the MP3-player market.
Some preliminary evidence that the model is consistent with actual bidding behavior can be gleaned from simple summary statistics of the data: Most eventual winners won only one unit within the data-period (93% in MP3-players and 87% in movies). Yet, a substantial number of bidders participated in more than one auction (43% in MP3-players and 33% in movies). One alternative explanation of multi-auction bidding can be ruled out right away: It does not seem that the multi-auction bidders simply submitted a very low bid initially to learn about the auction process or their true valuation, and only later raised their bid to their "full" willingness to pay.
Instead, of the 2276 bidders who bid on the same movie-title at least twice in a row, only 49 percent submitted a higher second bid. The corresponding figure among the 4543 MP3-player bidders who bid on the same player-model at least twice in a row is 59 percent. A more precise test of the proposed model based on the empirical relationship between bids and properties of near-future auctions is described next.
Econometric test
The dataset is a biased sample of willingness-to-bid because on eBay, a bid can only be submitted if it exceeds the highest bid at the moment. Therefore, the dataset contains relatively more high bids and relatively fewer low bids than a random sample of willingness-to-bid modeled by the sealed-bid abstraction ( ) 
, , I , I ..., I
, z i is a vector of control-variables specific to the auction i, and ε is mean-zero error.
Consistent estimates of all parameters can be obtained by Ordinary Least Squares. Since the three different specifications of
are at least partially correlated, three separate specifications of (4) were estimated for both levels of m and both datasets. To improve the theoretical quality of the linear approximation implicit in (4), the analysis of the MP3-player dataset was further split into two separate analyses because of the high variance in the price across the types. The median type sold for a median price of $105, so the players were split into 15 "low-priced" players with median prices of less than $100, and 15 "high-priced" players with median prices above $100. In each level-specific analysis, the players corresponding to the other price-level are retained as part of the auction-stream, lumped together into the 31-st "other" type.
The control variables z i are discussed next.
Since order-statistics of the bidding distribution are used as dependent variables, the most important control variable is the number of current competing bidders, which varies from auction to auction, and which clearly increases any order-statistic ceteris paribus. The number of bidders in an auction is not accurately observed because of the truncation issue, but the number of observed unique bidders is probably highly correlated with the true number, and is used throughout. In specifying z i in equation (4), a non-parametric specification using a separate dummy for each number of observed bidders was considered, but it did not contribute much more than a simple linear effect used in the final analysis.
Besides the influence implied by the proposed model, including current competition also controls for the following alternative explanation of a potential negative correlation between the near-future desirability and order-statistics of current bids: If the bidders, instead of acting sequentially as proposed, randomly chose only one auction of their product-type to bid in and subsequently acted myopically by bidding their valuation, more auctions in a short time-period would imply both a more desirable near future, and fewer bidders per auction -hence a lower order-statistic of the bids. Therefore, there would arise a mechanical negative correlation between near-future desirability and the order-statistic of the current bids, and including the current number of bidders as a control is critical to rule out this explanation.
Other control-variables included in z i were a measure of seller reputation 8 shown by Resnick et al (2002) , Wilcox(2000) and many others to have a positive impact on bids, a dummy variable for the description of the unit containing words like "new" or "mint" as a coarse measure of within-type vertical differentiation of the products, and (not included by eBay in the movie dataset) seller-controlled differentiation indicators of the listing itself like "photo included", "bold-type listing", or "gallery listing".
Since only the highest and the second highest bid in each auction are used in the analysis and eBay does not allow a bidder to outbid herself, the two order-statistics correspond to bids submitted by different people, and each is the highest bid in the auction submitted by its respective bidder. The analysis thus resolves the issue of "multiple bidding", i.e. the fact that some eBay bidders submit multiple bids in the same auction, by retaining the highest bid for each bidder as "the" bid of that bidder in the auction. Multiple bidding remains an unresolved curiosity of eBay because it cannot constitute equilibrium behavior even if the bidders have a common value (as shown by Bajari & Hortacsu 2003) . Instead, multiple bidding has been linked to bidder inexperience by both Roth & Ockenfels (2002) and by Wilcox (2000) , and explained at least partially as a "naïve English" bidding scheme that ignores the eBay proxy system and instead bids as if the eBay auctions were open-outcry English auctions and bidders paid their bids. Capturing multiple bidding is beyond the scope of the present model because of the assumed sealed-bid abstraction, but both datasets used here suggest that multiple bidding is, in fact, not very prevalent (71 percent of movie-bidders and 46 percent of MP3-player bidders never engage in multi-bidding) and it is also negatively correlated with bidder experience as suggested by previous findings.
In both datasets, special care was taken to exclude bids obviously not made by private bidders modeled by the theory. In the MP3-player data, bids made by sellers (about 2 percent) as well as bids made by bidders who won more that one unit within the data-period (about 12 percent of highest and 7 percent of second-highest) were eliminated, resulting in 4068 highest bids and 4099 second-highest bids. Among the movie-auctions, around a hundred (3 percent) of both highest and second-highest bids were eliminated because of being made by a seller or by a bidder who won multiple units of the same title, and another approximately hundred bids were eliminated because they were made by bidders who bid on too many types, resulting in 3114 highest and 2433 second-highest bids. Please see Table 1 for summary statistics of all the variables in the final datasets used in estimation.
Results
In both datasets and according to both order-statistics of bids, bidders seem to engage in at least one form of forward-seeing bidding. The two datasets are discussed in turn, Table 2 presents the parameter estimates for movies, Table 3 auction. Analogously, delaying the next offering of the same product by a mere hour from the average of 53 minutes is correlated with an increase in bids of over $2. Note that all these estimates are actually conservative because they suffer from the errors-in-variables problem and are hence biased towards zero. All control-variable parameters have the anticipated signs, but unlike in the movie dataset, some variables are insignificant, notably most of the listing-variables under seller control like photo, bold and gallery. The insignificance does not imply that these instruments are of no value because their usage is endogenous.
V. Discussion
This paper studies what happens when the role of an auction changes from selling unique objects at Sotheby's to driving large sequential markets for consumer durables on eBay and other online auction sites. In such markets, seemingly independent auctions become linked through the demand-side strategies. When participating in a sequence of auctions for substitutes, rational forward-looking bidders reduce their bids in anticipation of future auctions offering the same products. When details of some future offerings are already common knowledge as near-future offerings are on eBay, rational forward-looking bidders base their bids on the available information. This paper proposed a new model of such forward-looking bidding, compared its empirical predictions to the predictions of two nested models of simplified bidding behavior, and found strong support for the predicted behavior in actual eBay data from two different productcategories -movies on DVD and MP3-players.
The model departs from previous models of sequential auctions by assuming that bidders know not only the type of the current product they are bidding on, but also what and when will be sold next. Then, under a wide variety of assumptions, there exists an intuitive pure-strategy
Markov-perfect equilibrium of the game among the bidders, and the equilibrium bidding strategy can be qualitatively characterized. All rational bidders reduce their current bids when there are more near-future auctions in general, as well as when more of those auctions offer units of the good specifically desired by the bidders and when those units are offered sooner. These findings contribute to the auction-theory literature, and they have obvious relevance to bidders in sequential auctions on eBay or elsewhere.
In both eBay product-categories studied, a test of the model predictions rejects the alternative simpler model without forward-seeing. Moreover, in both categories, at least some bidders seem to take detailed information about the near future into account, leading to pricereductions between three and seven percent whenever the same type of good is available in the next five auctions. The empirical evidence therefore strongly suggests that the bidders behave consistently with the proposed model, and that such behavior does have a sizeable economic impact on the seller revenues.
The findings give focus to future modelers of online auction marketplaces by providing a fairly high lower bound on the sophistication of eBay bidders: eBay bidders look beyond a single auction as they should, and they seem to systematically take what they see into account. The findings reported here may also have impact on seller strategies, leading to yet more future research. There has been a dramatic increase in the use of auctions and one could ask whether the inter-auction competition analyzed in this paper will limit the extent to which auctions are used in the future. Understanding the supply side of the auction-driven markets is an interesting topic for future research that may shed light on this question of the scope of auctiondriven markets. Throughout this paper, the seller was assumed to be exogenous, but allowing for strategic selling may both qualitatively and quantitatively change the bidder's strategy. A companion paper (Zeithammer 2004 ) provides the first model of such strategic sellers facing forward-looking buyers described here. This first "full-equilibrium" model demonstrates that the forward-looking effects documented here can persist even when the sellers are also strategic.
Moreover, it seems that equilibrium forward-looking bidding strategies automatically reduce the bid-decrement when the sellers' profitability of selling in the auction marketplaces diminishes, and the existence of the forward-looking and forward-seeing strategies thus does not necessarily reduce the scope of auction-marketplaces as trading institutions for substitutes (please see
Zeithammer 2004 for details).
It is interesting to contrast this demand-side of the implied market with a demand-side of a traditional posted-price market. In both marketplaces, consumers engage in sequential search.
The difference is not just in the increased rapidity and built-in non-reversibility of the implied "search" in the auction marketplace. This paper demonstrates that in the online-auction marketplace, useful information about the other (future) purchase opportunities is available, and this information enters current observed demand, effectively making the underlying "search" less sequential and more simultaneous by integrating information about several purchaseopportunities. This paper provides the first step, but more research is clearly needed to see In the movie-data, the shares of each type range fairly continuously from 1.5% to 14.1% (Black Hawk Down).
In the MP3-player data, each both low-and high-priced players have dominant products, KB Gear Jamp3 (27%) in the low-priced category and Diamond Rio 500 (48%) in the high-priced category. The shares of the remaining products are all below 10% and decline fairly continuously to 1% for the 30-th product. Note to Table 2 : 30 movie-title fixed-effects are suppressed for parsimony. The first model has a slightly smaller sample-size because calculating time until next auction of the same type for every type requires a longer forward-seeing horizon and hence there is more truncation of forward-seeing information in the end of the data-period. Note to Table 3 : Please also see note to Table 2 for an explanation of different sample-sizes.
because for all c 0 : solution to (2). Moreover, the solution to (2) The G distribution arises from all the surviving losers of the current auctions as well as from all the new entrants, and since the number of each is random, G is not simple to evaluate. However, it will always be true that the expected competition after a desired type is sold today is always slightly weaker than when today's type is not desired because a trade means that the highest competing bidder certainly exited the bidder pool while no trade means that the highest competing bidder only exited the bidder pool with probability (1-λ).
Therefore, ( ) today's type, it is always better to face a desired type tomorrow than not. Since higher ρ increases the chance of φ 2 =1, the result follows. QED
